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A CONSIDERATION OF THE MORE EXTENDED USE
OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT

L

AST MARCH

SAMUEL M. DRIVER*

I chanced to read Circuit Judge Jerome N. Frank's

article in the Journal of the American JudicatureSociety, entitled
"The Case for the Special Verdict." It was based upon Judge Frank's
opinion in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.' In that case,
a car repairman sued the railroad company for personal injuries under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. At the trial, the court refused to
submit to the jury a special verdict, requested by the defendant, and a
general verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant
appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The choice of the kind of
verdict to be returned by the jury was regarded as a matter within
the discretion of the trial court. Judge Frank, however, in outspoken
and persuasive dicta, pointed out the many shortcomings of the general
verdici and the marked advantages of the special verdict. His opinion
was an undisguised exhortation to trial judges to make more extensive
use of the special verdict as provided in Rule 49 (a) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Judge Frank's article and opinion intrigued me and
aroused my curiosity. They caused me to speculate as to whether the
trial courts were neglecting Rule 49 (a) and, if so, whether there was
any sound reason for their doing so other than the natural inertia
which tends to hold courts and judges in the procedural grooves to
which they are accustomed.
This discussion will cover only subdivision (a) of Rule 49, but I
feel that I should briefly distinguish it from subdivision (b), the other
subdivision of the rule, since the cases reveal a surprising amount of
confusion regarding them. Subdivision (a) provides that the court may
require the jury to return only a special verdict in the form of special
findings on each issue of fact formulated by the pleadings and the evidence. The special verdict may be in the form of either written findings
or written questions, susceptible of categorical or other brief answer,
covering the factual issues. In any case, it is purely a fact verdict. The
jury finds the basic facts and the court then arrives at appropriate conclusions of law and enters judgment accordingly. No general verdict
is submitted to the jury with a special verdict.
*United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington.
1167 F.(2d) 54 (C.C.A. 2d 1948).
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Subdivision (b) of Rule 49 provides for submission to the jury,
together with a general verdict, of written interrogatories on one or
more issues of fact, the decision of which is necessary to a verdict.
Under subdivision (b) the general verdict is always employed. The
fact interrogatories do not dispense with the general verdict, but
merely serve to test and explain it.
It is interesting to note the confusion in one of the concurring opinions in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.2 with reference to
the function of the special verdict. Mention is therein made of taking
"a special verdict along with a general verdict" and of the possibility
that the special verdict may "expose the generaLverdict to defeat" by
showing up its deficiencies. As I have just pointed out, a general verdict
is never submitted with a special verdict under Rule 49 (a).
How extensively is the special verdict being used by the federal trial
courts? So far as I have been able to discover, no direct statistics are
available, but there are what appear to me to be plain indications that,
in most jurisdictions, its use has been very limited. The fact that the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered it necessary, in itg opinion
in the Skidmore case, to make such an urgent and forceful appeal for
greater use of the special verdict is, in itself, significant, and much the
same thing has been d6ne in other circuits. In the Ninth Circuit, in
Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Zane,8 Judge Bone has pointed out that the
general or lump verdict makes it impossible for an appellate court to
determine what facts the jury found and that the difficulty can be
avoided by the use of special jury fact findings under Rule 49. The
Court of Appeals of the Third' and Fifth' Circuits in reversing and
remanding for further proceedings have recommended that the special
verdict be used upon retrial of the case.
There are other indications that Rule 49 (a) has not generally been
adopted as standard practice. In the fore part of each volume of the
Federal Rules Decisions, there is a table showing the cases in which
the rules have been cited. I have scrutinized all of the tables in bound
volumes 1 to 7, inclusive, and in the advance issues through May, 1949,
Volume 9, No. 1, and I have examined every case in which Rule 49
has been cited, according to the tables. For the ten-year period, 1939
2

Id. at 70.

8 160 F. (2d) 731, 737 (C.C.A. 9th 1947)."
4 See Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.(2d) 355, 369 (C.C.A. 3rd 1948).
"It would make for a just verdict in this case if the trial judge would submit to the
jury questions for special findings as to said basic facts."
GSee Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F. (2d) 196, 199 (C.C.A. 5th 1946).
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to 1949, I found only four published district court opinions involving
the use of special verdicts. Two of the four cases were in district courts
of Texas, where the special verdict was in common use in the state
courts, as it was in Wisconsin and North Carolina also, prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. During that same
ten-year period, I found only eight cases in courts of appeals involving
a question in connection with the submission to the jury 6f a special
verdict by the district court. Three of such cases were appeals from
District Courts of Texas and another was from a District Court of
Wisconsin. I also found that during the same period, there were six
cases in which appeal was taken because of the refusal of the district
court to submit a requested special verdict.
I was, at first, puzzled to discover that in one of the Texas cases,
District Judge Kennerly of the southern district submitted a special
verdict under Rule 49 in an action by the United States to acquire a
tract of land by condemnation under the power of eminent domain.
Rule 81 expressly provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure are not
applicable in condemnation proceedings except as to appeals. Judge
Kennerly's court made them applicable by the simple expedient of
adopting them as a part of the local district court rules under the provisions of Rule. 83.6
I am aware, of course, that special verdicts have been returned in
many cases where no opinion was written by the trial court and no
appeal was taken, but, nevertheless, it seems obvious that if Rule
49 (a) were in common use, there would be more cases citing it in the
books. The fact that over a ten-year period, the cases in the courts of
appeals, in which it appears to have been involved, average less than
one to the circuit indicates that, aside from those states which had the
practice before the adoption of Rule 49, the special verdict has been
given scant consideration.
If the reluctance of the trial courts to utilize, the special verdict is
due to actual opposition rather than sheer inertia, it appears to be an
inarticulate opposition. While my research on the subject has been far
from exhaustive, I have not found a single opinion, law journal article,
or other wiiting advocating abandonment of Rule 49(a). On the other
hand, there is a wealth of written material denouncing the general
6 U.S. v. 2,877.33 Acres of Land, 52 F. Supp. 696, 698, 702 (S. D. Tex. 1943). See
also U.S. v. 16,572 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp. 555, 558 (S. D. Tex. 1943).
1
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verdict and advocating that it be replaced by the fact-finding special
verdict.

7

With unusual unanimity of opinion, lawyers, judges, and legal writers have joined in condemning the general verdict. A statement of its
peculiarities and shortcomings, so clear and logical that it has often
been quoted, is that of Professor Sunderland.8 In part, it is as follows:
The peculiarity of the general verdict is the merger into a single indivisible residuum of all matters, however numerous, whether of law or fact.
...The law supplies the means for determining neither what facts were
found, nor what principles of law were applied, nor how the application was
made. There are therefore three unknown elements which enter into the
general verdict: (a) the facts; (b) the law; (c) the application of the law
to the facts. And it is clear that the verdict is liable to three sources of
error, corresponding to these three elements. It is also clear that if error
does occur in any of these matters it cannot be discovered, for the constituents of the compound cannot be ascertained. No one but the jurors can tell
what was put into it and the jurors will not be heard to say....
As to the second element in the general verdict, the law, it is a matter on
which the jury is necessarily ignorant. The jurors are taken from the body
of the county, and it is safe to say that the last man who could be called or
allowed to sit would be a lawyer. They are second-hand dealers in law, and
must get it from the judge. They can supply nothing themselves; they are a
mere conduit pipe through which the court supplies the law that goes into
the general verdict. But while the jury can contribute nothing of value so
far as the law is concerned, it has infinite capacity for mischief, for twelve
men can easily misunderstand more law in a minute than the judge can
explain in an hour.... The instructions upon the law given by the court
to the jury are an effort to give, in the space of a few minutes, a legal education to twelve laymen upon the branch of the law involved in the case. Law
cannot be taught in any such way. As to this element, accordingly, the
general verdict is almost necessarily a failure.
As to the third element in the general verdict-the application of the law

to the facts, we find the same difficulty as in the case of the first elementa merging of the law into the verdict in such a way that it is impossible to
tell how or whether the jury applied the law ....

Whether the jurors delib-

erately and openly threw the law into the discard, and rendered a verdict
out of their own heads, or whether they applied the law correctly as instructed by the court, or whether they tried to apply it properly but failed
for lack of understanding-these are the questions respecting which the
verdict discloses nothing. So far, therefore, as the third element goes, the
7 See e.g., Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, 29 YALE L. J. 253 (1920);

Green, A New Development of Jury Law, 13 A. B. A. J. 715 (1927) ; Morgan, A Brief
History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories,32 YALE L. J. 588 (1923) ;
McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions, 2 F. R. D. 176 (1943); Rossman.
The Judge-Jury Relationship in the State Courts, 3 F. R. D. 98 (1944).
8 See note 7 supra.
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general verdict is an unknown and unknowable mystery, with the balance of
probability against it.... We come, then, to this position, that the general
verdict... confers on the jury a vast power to commit error and do mischief by loading it with technical burdens far beyond its ability to perform,
by confusing it in aggregating instead of segregating the issues; and by
shrouding in secrecy and mystery the actual results of its deliberations.

As a trial judge, I have made a special effort to formulate instructions for juries in such a-way that they will be comprehensible to laymen, but I have found that in all but the simplest cases, it is impossible
to do so if the instructions are complete and technically accurate.
When the issues are complex and legal principles must be explained
and fine distinctions accurately drawn, lay jurors are incapable of
understanding and correctly applying the court's instructions as to
the law. In giving such instructions, I find it difficult to escape the
feeling that I am merely following a meaningless, childish ritual.
The special verdict offers what appears to be a satisfactory solution
to many of the problems of the general verdict. It eliminates two of
Professor Sunderland's three unknown elements, inherent in the general verdict, namely, the law and the app.lcation of the law to the
facts, and leaves to the jury the single task of finding the facts. It
requires of the jury a detailed consideration of the factual issues. Since,
in most cases, it is not readily apparent to the jury which side their
findings favor, the influence of prejudice and sympathy on their verdict
is minimized. The special verdict also discloses to the parties, the trial
court, and the appellate court, in the event of appeal, precisely what
answer the jury made to each fact question presented for determination. And it relieves the trial court of the burden of giving detailed,
comprehensive instructions on the principles of law involved. Only
such instructions need be given as are necessary to enable the jury to
understand and intelligently answer the fact findings, or fact questions, presented.
As Judge Frank remarked in his opinion in the Skidmore case, "the
special verdict is no newfangled idea." It was used by early common
law juries as a device to escape the punishment of attaint that could
be imposed upon them by the judges if their general verdicts were
considered erroneous.9 It was not, however, generally accepted, as it
logically should have been, for the reason that it was hedged about by
impractical, hampering restrictions. There was a rigid requirement
that the jury must find all the material facts in issue. If any such facts
-

9See Morgan, supra note 7, at 588.
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were omitted, a new trial must be had. The requirements as to the
form of the verdict were too exacting also. The jury must find ultimate
facts, not evidentiary facts, and not mere conclusions of law." It is
apparent from the language of the opinion in Graham v. Bayne,1
decided by the Supreme Court in 1855, why trial judges justifiably
were reluctant to employ the common law special verdict:
If a special verdict be ambiguous, or imperfect-if it find but the evidence
of facts, and not the facts themselves, or finds but part of the facts in issue,
and is silent as to others-it is a mistrial, and the court of error must order
a venire de novo.
Rule 49 was designed to eliminate, so far as possible, the hampering
restrictions on the common law special verdict. The rule provides that
if the court omits any issue of fact, each party waives his right to trial
by jury thereon unless he demands its submission before the jury
retires. The rule further specifies that the court shall make a finding
as to any omitted issue, or if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have
made a finding in accord with the judgment entered on the special
verdict. The rule has thus eliminated the danger of invalidating a jury
trial by the inadvertent omission of some material issue of fact from
the special verdict submitted.
There still remains the difficulty of framing the special verdict in
such a way as to elicit findings of ultimate facts rather than evidentiary facts or conclusions of law, but there is no indication that appellate courts are inclined to be exacting in that respect. My research has
disclosed no case, during the ten years of operation of Rule 49 (a), in
which a district court has been reversed because of having submitted
to a jury a special verdict defective or inadequate as to form. In
Mourikas v. Vardianos,2 objection was made to the form of the fact
interrogatories comprising the special verdict, but the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the form of the interrogatories was in the
sound discretion of the trial court and affirmed the judgment.
My conclusion is that the special verdict under Rule 49(a) has
many advantages over the general verdict and should be much more
extensively employed than it has been in the past. It is peculiarly
adaptable for use in connection With the pre-trial conference. If, by
pre-trial, the factual issues have been narrowed to embrace only the
real meat of the controversy and have been clearly and sharply defined,
10 See Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,25 VA. L. REv. 261, 287 (1939).
11 18 How. 60, 63 (U.S. 1855).
12

169 F.(2d) 53 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
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it should not be difficult to formulate a special verdict for the jury. The
special verdict is not a cure-all and, with more extensive use, may very
well develop imperfections of its own, but it seems to me that, everything considered, it is much to be preferred to the crude, unfair, and
childishly unrealistic general verdict.

